Area 51 The Revealing Truth of Ufos, Secret Aircraft, Cover-Ups & Conspiracies
The site also commemorates two CIA A-12 pilots, Walt Ray and Jack Weeks, killed in 1967 and 1968, respectively. For the CIA work-force, the A-12 is a symbol of the successful collaboration of the Intelligence Community, the Defense Department, and private industry to create a national strategic asset that our adversaries never dreamed possible.”
While the above CIA documentation provides us with fascinating background material on Area 51, the U-2 plane, the SR-71, and much more, another agency document adds far more to the story, complements the material above, and fills a few gaps. It begins: “One spring day in 1962 a test pilot named Louis Schalk, employed by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, took off from the Nevada desert in an aircraft the likes of which had never been seen before.
A casual observer would have been startled by the appearance of this vehicle; he would perhaps have noticed especially its extremely long, slim, shape, its two enormous jet engines, its long, sharp, projecting nose, and its swept-back wings which appeared far too short to support the fuselage in flight. He might well have realized that this was a revolutionary airplane; he could not have known that it would be able to fly at three times the speed of sound for more than 3,000 miles without refueling, or that toward the end of its flight, when fuel began to run low, it could cruise at over 90,000 feet. Still less would he have known of the equipment it was to carry, or of the formidable problems attending its design and construction.”
The CIA adds more to the story: “There was, of course, no casual observer present. The aircraft had been designed and built for reconnaissance; it was projected as a successor to the U-2. Its development had been carried out in profound secrecy. Despite the numerous designers, engineers, skilled and unskilled workers, administrators, and others who had been involved in the affair, no authentic accounts, and indeed scarcely any accounts at all, had leaked.
Many aspects have not been revealed to this day, and many are likely to remain classified for some time to come.” The official designation of the aircraft was A-12, says the CIA: “By a sort of inspired perversity, however, it came to be called OXCART, a code word also applied to the program under which it was developed. The secrecy in which it was so long shrouded has lifted a bit, and the purpose of this article is to give some account of the inception, development, operation, and untimely demise of this remarkable airplane. The OXCART no longer flies, but it left a legacy of technological achievement which points the way to new projects. And it became the progenitor of a similar but somewhat less sophisticated reconnaissance vehicle called the SR-71, whose existence is well known to press and public.”
In this particular CIA paper, we learn much more about the U-2 program: “The U-2 dated from 1954, when its development began under the direction of a group headed by Richard M. Bissell of CIA. In June 1956, the aircraft became operational, but officials predicted that its useful lifetime over the USSR could hardly be much more than 18 months or two years. Its first flights over Soviet territory revealed that the air defense warning system not only detected but tracked it quite accurately. Yet it remained a unique and invaluable source of intelligence information for almost four years, until on 1 May 1960, Francis Gary Powers was shot down near Sverdlovsk. “Meanwhile, even as the U-2 commenced its active career, efforts were under way to make it less vulnerable—the hope was to reduce the vehicle’s radar cross-section, so that it would become less susceptible to detection.
New developments in radar-absorbing materials were tried out and achieved considerable success, though not enough to solve the problem. Various far-out designs were explored, most of them seeking to create an aircraft capable of flying at extremely high altitudes, though still at relatively slow speed. None of them proved practicable.” Finally, and in the latter part of 1957, the CIA reports: “Bissell arranged with a contractor for a job of operations analysis to determine how far the probability of shooting down an airplane varied respectively with the plane’s speed, altitude, and radar cross-section. This analysis demonstrated that supersonic speed greatly reduced the chances of detection by radar. The
probability of being shot down was not of course reduced to zero, but it was evident that the supersonic line of approach was worth serious consideration.
Therefore, from this time on, attention focused increasingly on the possibility of building a vehicle that could fly at extremely high speeds as well as at great altitudes, and that would also incorporate the best that could be attained in radar- absorbing capabilities. Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and Convair Division of General Dynamics were informed of the general requirement, and their designers set to work on the problem without as yet receiving any contract or funds from the government. From the fall of 1957 to late 1958 these designers constantly refined and adapted their respective schemes. “As the months went by, the general outlines of what might be done took shape in the minds of those concerned.
Late in November 1958, the members of the panel held a crucial meeting. They agreed that it now appeared feasible to build an aircraft of such speed and altitude as to be very difficult to track by radar. They recommended that the President be asked to approve in principle a further prosecution for the project, and to make funds available for further studies and test. The President and his Scientific Advisor, Dr. James Killian, were already aware of what was going on, and when CIA officials went to them with the recommendation of the panel they received a favorable hearing.
The President gave his approval. Lockheed and Convair were then asked to submit definite proposals, funds were made available to them, and the project took on the code name GUSTO.” The CIA says that in a little less than one year, “the two proposals were essentially complete, and on 20 July 1959, the President was again briefed. This time he gave final approval, which signified that the program could get fully under way. The next major step was to choose between the Lockheed and Convair designs.
On 20 August 1959 specifications of the two proposals were submitted to a joint DOD/USAF/CIA selection panel. The Lockheed design was selected, Project GUSTO terminated, and the program to develop a new U-2 follow-on aircraft was named OXCART. On 3 September 1959, CIA authorized Lockheed to proceed with antiradar studies, aerodynamic structural tests, and engineering designs, and on 30 January 1960 gave the green light to produce 12 aircraft.”
The CIA provides a fascinating background on not just the aircraft but the brave men flying them: “Pilots for the OXCART would obviously have to be of quite extraordinary competence, not only because of the unprecedented performance of the aircraft itself, but also because of the particular qualities needed in men who were to fly intelligence missions.
Brigadier General Don Flickinger, of the Air Force, was designated to draw up the criteria for selection, with advice from Kelly Johnson and from CIA Headquarters. Pilots had to be qualified in the latest high performance fighters, emotionally stable, and well- motivated. They were to be between 25 and 40 years of age, and the size of the A-12 cockpit prescribed that they be under six feet tall and under 175 pounds in weight.”
Considerable time was spent grooming prospective pilots and figuring out who would pass muster and who would not: “Air Force files were screened for possible candidates and a list of pilots obtained. Psychological assessments, physical examinations and refinement of criteria eliminated a good many. Pre- evaluation processing resulted in sixteen potential nominees. This group underwent a further intensive security and medical scrutiny by the Agency.
Those who remained were then approached to take employment with the Agency on a highly classified project involving a very advanced aircraft. In November 1961, commitments were obtained from five of the group. The small number recruited at this stage required that a second search be undertaken.” Still on this matter, the CIA gives us the following: “When the final screening was complete the pilots selected for the program were William L. Skliar, Kenneth S. Collins, Walter Ray, Lon Walter, Mele Vojvodich, Jr., Jack W. Weeks, Ronald ‘Jack’ Layton, Dennis B. Sullivan, David P. Young, Francis J.
Murray, and Russell Scott. After the selection, arrangements were made with the Air Force to effect appropriate transfers and assignments to cover their training and to lay the basis for their transition from military to civilian status. Compensation and insurance arrangements were similar to those for the U-2 pilots.”
This particular CIA file then focuses its attentions not so much on the pilots and the aircraft but on the matter of where, precisely, the program should be housed. On this matter, we have this from the agency: “One thing to be decided in the earliest stages of the program was where to base and test the aircraft.
Lockheed clearly could not do the business at Burbank, where the aircraft were being built, if for no other reason that its runway was too short. The ideal location ought to be remote from metropolitan areas; well away from civil and military airways to preclude observation; easily accessible by air; blessed with good weather the year round; capable of accommodating large numbers of personnel; equipped with fuel storage facilities; fairly close to an Air Force installation; and possessing at least an 8,000 foot runway. There was no such place to be found.