It should be noted that the aforementioned “secluded site in Nevada” was a careful and couched reference to the vast piece of land that encompasses Area 51.
Area 51 The Revealing Truth of Ufos, Secret Aircraft, Cover-Ups & Conspiracies
“Ten Air Force bases programmed for closure were considered, but none provided the necessary security and annual operating costs at most of them would be unacceptable—Edwards Air Force Base in California seemed a more likely candidate, but in the end it also was passed over. Instead, a secluded site in Nevada was finally picked. It was deficient in personnel accommodations and POL storage, and its long-unused runway was inadequate, but security was good, or could be made so, and a moderate construction program could provide sufficient facilities. Lockheed estimated what would be needed in such respects as monthly fuel consumption, hangars and shop space, housing for personnel, and runway specifications.
Armed with the list of major requirements, Headquarters came up with a construction and engineering plan. And in case anyone became curious about what was going on at this remote spot, a cover story stated that the facilities were being prepared for certain radar studies, to be conducted by an engineering firm with support from the Air Force. The remote location was explained as necessary to reduce the effect of electronic interference from outside sources.” It should be noted that the aforementioned “secluded site in Nevada” was a careful and couched reference to the vast piece of land that encompasses Area 51.
Construction of the facility, the CIA states, “began in earnest in September 1960, and continued on a double-shift schedule until mid-1964. One of the most urgent tasks was to build the runway, which according to initial estimates of A- 12 requirements must be 8,500 feet long. The existing asphalt runway was 5,000 feet long and incapable of supporting the weight of the A-12. The new one was built between 7 September and 15 November and involved pouring over 25,000 yards of concrete.
Another major problem was to provide some 500,000 gallons of PF-I aircraft fuel per month. Neither storage facilities nor means of transporting fuel existed. After considering airlift, pipeline, and truck transport, it was decided that the last-named was the most economical, and could be made feasible by resurfacing no more than eighteen miles of highway leading into the base.”
Continuing in the vein of construction, the CIA’s records state: “Three surplus Navy hangars were obtained, dismantled, and erected on the north side of the base. Over 100 surplus Navy housing buildings were transported to the base and made ready for occupancy. By early 1962 a fuel tank farm was ready, with a capacity of 1,320,000 gallons. Warehousing and shop space was begun and repairs made to older buildings.
All this, together with the many other facilities that had to be provided, took a long time to complete. Meanwhile, however, the really essential facilities were ready in time for the forecast delivery date of Aircraft No. 1 in August 1961.” Then, the time for action was upon everyone, as the CIA shows: “Finally, on 26 April 1962, Aircraft 121 was ready. On that day, in accordance with Kelly Johnson’s custom, Louis Schalk took it for an unofficial, unannounced, maiden flight lasting some 40 minutes—as in all maiden flights minor problems were detected, but it took only four more days to ready the aircraft for its first official flight.
“On 30 April 1962, just under one year later than originally planned, the A- 12 officially lifted her wheels from the runway. Piloted again by Louis Schalk, it took off at 170 knots, with a gross weight of 72,000 pounds; and climbed to 30,000 feet. Top speed was 340 knots and the flight lasted 59 minutes. The pilot reported that the aircraft responded well and was extremely stable. Kelly Johnson declared it to be the smoothest official first flight of any aircraft he had designed or tested. The aircraft broke the sound barrier on its second official flight, 4 May 1962, reaching Mach 1.1. Again, only minor problems were reported.
“With these flights accomplished, jubilation was the order of the day. The new Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. John McCone, sent a telegram of congratulation to Kelly Johnson. A critical phase had been triumphantly passed, but there remained the long, difficult, and sometimes discouraging process of working the aircraft up to full operational performance.” While it’s a matter of historical fact that certain sensitive documents relative to the Cuban Missile Crisis—which ran for thirteen days, specifically from October 16–28, 1962—still remain sensitive and are still held behind closed doors, the CIA has taken steps to at least make the picture a bit more clear: “The OXCART program received a shot in the arm from the Cuban missile crisis. U-2’s had been maintaining a regular reconnaissance vigil over the island, and it was on one of these missions in October that the presence of offensive missiles was discovered.
Overflights thereafter became more frequent, but on 27 October an Agency U-2, flown by a Strategic Air Force pilot on a SAC-directed mission, was shot down by a surface-to-air missile. This raised the dismaying possibility that continued manned, high-altitude surveillance of Cuba might become out of the question. The OXCART program suddenly assumed greater significance than ever, and its achievement of operational status became one of the highest national priorities.” Moving on, following the tragic killing of President John F. Kennedy at Dealey Plaza, Dallas, Texas, on November 22, 1963 (by whom, though, is anyone’s guess), the CIA states: “President Johnson was brought up to date on the project a week after taking office, and directed that a paper be prepared for an announcement in the spring of 1964.”
It was on February 24, 1964, that President Johnson said the following: “The United States has successfully developed on advanced experimental jet aircraft, the A-11, which has been tested in sustained flight at more than 2,000 miles per hour and at altitudes in excess of 70,000 feet. The performance of the A-11 far exceeds that of any other aircraft in the world today. The development of this aircraft has been made possible by major advances in aircraft technology of great significance for both military and commercial applications. Several A- 11 aircraft are now being flight tested at Edwards Air Force Base in California.
The existence of this program is being disclosed today to permit the orderly exploitation of this advance technology in our military and commercial program.” We learn still yet more from the heart of the CIA: “During November 1965, the very month when OXCART was finally declared operational, the moves toward its demise commenced. Within the Bureau of the Budget a memorandum was circulated expressing concern at the costs of the A-12 and SR-71 programs, both past and projected. It questioned the requirement for the total number of aircraft represented in the combined fleets, and doubted the necessity for a separate CIA (OXCART) fleet. Several alternatives were proposed to achieve a substantial reduction in the forecasted spending, but the recommended course was to phase out the A-12 program by September 1966 and stop any further procurement of SR-71 aircraft.
Copies of this memorandum were sent to the Department of Defense and the CIA with the suggestion that those agencies explore the alternatives set out in the paper. But the Secretary of Defense declined to consider the proposal, presumably because the SR-7l would not be operational by September 1966.” Additionally, the CIA said this in 2015: “In summary: the OXCART Program lasted just over ten years, from its first inception in 1957 through first flights in 1962 to termination in 1968.
Lockheed produced 15 OXCARTS, three YF-12-A’s, and 31 SR-71’s. Five OXCART’s were lost in accidents; two pilots were killed, and two had narrow escapes. In addition, two F-101 chase planes were lost with their Air Force pilots during OXCART’s testing phase. As of a year or so ago, the 49 supersonic aircraft had completed more than 7,300 flights, with 17,000 hours in the air. Over 2,400 hours had been above Mach 3.
“The main objective of the program—to create a reconnaissance aircraft of unprecedented speed, range, and altitude capability—was triumphantly achieved.
It may well be, however, that the most important aspects of the effort lay in its by-products—the notable advances in aerodynamic design, engine performance, cameras, electronic countermeasures, pilot life support systems, antiradar devices, and above all in milling, machining, and shaping titanium. Altogether it was a pioneering accomplishment.” It was, indeed, and it’s important to note that certain key issues relative to the U-2 program, to the SR-71, and to the overall OXCART program would still be out of the public domain were it not for the CIA’s very welcome decision to take a far more open stance on the matter—and on the issue of Area 51, too.
Perhaps, in time, we will see other agencies of the intelligence community, the government, and the military become more visible on matters relative to Area 51. I have left one issue for the very end of this chapter. A connection exists between the early flights of secret aircraft out of Area 51 in the 1950s and the UFO phenomenon. In 1998, the CIA prepared a document titled “The CIA and the U2 Program, 1954–1974.” In part, it states: “High-altitude testing of the U2 soon led to an unexpected side effect—a tremendous increase in reports of unidentified flying objects. In the mid-1950s, most commercial airliners flew at altitudes between 10,000 and 20,000 feet and military aircraft like the B47s and B57s operated at altitudes below 40,000 feet.
Consequently, once U-2s started flying at altitudes above 60,000 feet, air-traffic controllers began receiving increasing numbers of UFO reports.” The document continues: “Not only did the airline pilots report their sightings to air-traffic controllers, but they and ground-based observers also wrote letters to the Air Force unit at Wright Air Development Command in Dayton charged with investigating such phenomena. This, in turn, led to the Air Force’s Operation BLUE BOOK. Based at Wright-Patterson, the operation collected all reports of UFO sightings. Air Force investigators then attempted to explain such sightings by linking them to natural phenomena.
BLUE BOOK investigators regularly called on the Agency’s Project Staff in Washington to check reported UFO sightings against U-2 flight logs. This enabled the investigators to eliminate the majority of the UFO reports, although they could not reveal to the letter writers the true cause of the UFO sightings. U-2 and later OXCART flights accounted for more than one-half of all UFO reports during the 1950s and 1960s.” It’s not surprising that UFO researchers scoffed at the claims of the CIA that classified aircraft were responsible for more than 50 percent of all reported UFO incidents in the United States during the 1950s. Why the scoffing? Simple: The U-2 looked nothing like a flying saucer. It looked like what it was: an aircraft with a fuselage, wings, and a tail.